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A NEW DEAL IN A WORLD OF OLD ONES 
Theodore W. Ruger * 
For all of the fanfare and vitriol accompanying its passage last year, the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010 is a statute 
that raises as many questions as it answers. I The Act significantly reshapes 
private health insurance regulation and the federal government's role in 
providing access to insmance for almost all Americans. But despite its 
prodigious length of almost 2,000 pages,2 the details of the Act's new 
restrictions on insurers and health insurance exchanges that the Act creates 
remain amorphous pending the issuance of comprehensive administrative 
regulations. Crucial components of the new statute-its mandate for 
individuals to purchase health insurance3 and its expansion of Medicaid 
coverage in concert with state governments4-are the subject of 
constitutional challenge in multiple lawsuits filed by over a dozen states. 5 
Moreover, Republicans have pledged to make repeal of the Act a central 
plank of their platform in the fall 2010 elections and perhaps the 2012 
presidential race.6 Finally, second-order effects such as the response of 
private employers to the new public subsidized backstop of the exchanges, 
are also highly uncertain and could radically change the cost profile of the 
new government involvement in health insurance. 
In the face of such uncertainty, Dr. Theda Skocpol and Vanessa 
Williamson's illuminating essay in this volume provides several key 
vantage points for beginning to assess the Act's impact and meaning in the 
American political landscape.7 By invoking the powerful historical analog 
of the New Deal, Skocpol and Williamson highlight the Act's potentially 
transformative impact in terms of Americans' health care security and 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. 
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
2. See id. 
3. See id. §§ 15 01. SOOOA. 
4. See id. § 2001. 
5. For a collection of legal documents relating to litigation by states in federal courts in 
both Florida and Virginia, see ACA Litigation Blog, http://acaliligationblog.blogspot.com (last 
visited August 31, 2010). 
6. See, e.g .• Julian Walker, Gingrich Urges Blocking Health Care, VIRGINL"N-PILOT, 
May 24, 2010 (former Speaker predicting there was a 50·50 chance Republicans would repeal 
PPACA by 2013). 
7. See Theda Skocpol & Vanessa Williamson. Obama and The Transformation of us. 
Policy, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1203 (2011). 
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health insurance solidarity.8 The Act's redistributive financing mechanisms 
and its restrictions on underwriting differentiation by private insurers9 mean 
that Americans are interconnected as never before in the nation's health 
insurance and delivery systems. As Skocpol and Williamson state, this is an 
important shift in the public policy of the United States.lO For decades the 
United States has stood alone in failing to guarantee access to millions of its 
poorest and sickest citizens. The fact that the Act goes most of the way 
toward rectifying this coverage gap, and does so in the distinctly 
redistributive manner that the authors describe, marks it as a landmark 
public policy achievement that is worthy of discussion in the same breath as 
the New Deal programs. 
Yet the New Deal's value as a comparative exemplar in assessing the 
new Patient Protection Act lies in the major differences as well as the 
similarities between the two public policy events. The New Deal did more 
than redistribute resources within existing public and private structures-it 
also created and defined new legal and administrative institutions and 
norms, and in the process fundamentally transformed the relationship that 
American citizens and American companies had with the federal 
government. II Enacted onto what was in many areas a policy vacuum, at 
least as far as the federal government was concerned, major New Deal 
programs such as Social Secmity gained early and widespread public 
acceptance by conferring tangible benefits on most of the population where 
nothing meaningful had existed before. 12 Likewise, the various new 
regulatory agencies that the New Deal Congress created faced initial 
resistance from industry and the U.S. Supreme Court, 13 but once established 
had the luxury of operating on a regulatory blank slate, which gave greater 
latitude to these agencies' early institutional choices.'" 
8. See id. at 1203-4, 1228-29. 
9. See PPACA, §1201, 124 Stat. at 155 (defining exclusive permissible rating criteria for 
individual and small group markets). 
10. See Skocpol & Williamson, supra note 7. at 1203. 
II. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 259--61 (1998) 
(explaining that the New Deal embodied "a sweeping redetlnition of the aims and methods of 
American government"); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall a/Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342. 351 (2004) (describing the 
New Deal as a "paradigm shift" in American society and the role of the federal government). 
12. See, e.g., MERTON C. BERNSTEIN & JOAN BRODSHAUG BERNSTElOI, SOCIAL SECURITY: 
THE SYSTEM THAT WORKS (1988) (discussing patterns of popular support for Social Security). 
13. See, e.g., Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or FeUx the Cat, 107 HARV. L REv. 
620 (1994) (describing initial Supreme Court resistance to New Deal programs), 
14. See WILLIAM LEUCHTENBURG, FRAl\KLlN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-
40 (1963) (describing the regulatory initiatives undertaken by a panoply of new agencies). 
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None of this is true with respect to the new Patient Protection Act: it is 
fundamentally a gap-filling statute (though a sweeping one), aimed at 
closing significant loopholes in the complex existing architecture of public 
and private health insurance in the United States, and doing little to simplify 
or make more coherent the fragmented system that already exists. The Act 
cures two major shortfalls in current access to health insurance by 
expanding Medicaid dramatically to cover tens of millions of more people 
at or near the poverty line, and also through its exchange provisions will 
help many Americans with preexisting conditions gain access to health 
insurance.15 But in the immediate term it does little to rework the basic 
structure of the medical delivery system, replete with high levels of 
variation in physician practice and dramatic annual cost increases. 16 
Moreover, for all its breadth and length the Act is primarily about health 
insurance, not health care delivery. It leaves significant questions about the 
cost and quality of health care in the United States almost entirely 
unaddressed. For instance, the vast treatment discretion retained bv 
o 
individual physicians and other providers, and the large role for major 
corporations, are only faintly addressed in this statute, suggesting the need 
for another round of wrenching legislative debate before we truly witness a 
"New Deal" for American health care. As noted above, the PP ACA 
admirably deals with key questions of insurance access for all that have 
languished unaddressed for too long. However, it largely leaves the existing 
medical delivery system as it finds it. A true "New Deal" for American 
medicine in the twenty-first century will necessarily involve modifying the 
way the health industry provides care, not merely the way society pays for 
it. 
Additionally, the imposition of the Patient Protection Act's terms onto a 
public-private structure already ossified and in tum defined by New Deal 
and Great Society programs, threatens to reduce the public's enthusiasm, at 
least in the short run, for the changes it will produce. Expansion of health 
insurance for Americans has proceeded incrementally over the past seventy 
years since the New Deal. The first great expansion was of the number of 
Americans covered through their jobs by employment-based private health 
insurance: spurred by wartime wage freezes (that exempted benefit 
increases) and favorable tax treatment of health benefits, this trend rapidly 
15. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND" SUMMARY OF COVERAGE PROVISIONS IN THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010), available at http ://www.kfforg/ 
hea1threfomllup1oad/8023 -R. pdf. 
16. On variation in medical practice and associated cost complications, see, e.g .• Elliott S. 
Fischer et aI., The Implications of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. ParI 2: Health 
Outcomes and Satisfaction with Care, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 288 (2003). 
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expanded the number of Americans with private health insurance from 20.6 
million in 1940 to 142.3 million in 1950.17 In 1965 came the addition of the 
popular Medicare program, ensuring that most Americans over the age of 
65 would have access to health insurance.ls Taken together, the fact that 
most Americans already have access to health insurance has frustrated 
previous efforts to universalize coverage, and may reduce public support for 
the incremental coverage expansions of the PP ACA. 
Further extensions of the authors' New Deal comparison reveal other 
points of similarity and difference. This brief response aims to highlight a 
few of these similarities and differences. Of specific interest is the authors' 
focus on the redistributive features of the new statute.19 As Skocpol and 
Williamson describe, the Act redistributes resources for health insurance 
coverage in a manner that is novel and important. 20 Like the major New 
Deal entitlement and safety net programs, wealthier Americans will be 
asked to pay more in taxes to guarantee a decent minimum health insurance 
system for almost all Americans.21 But the redistribution is also subtle and 
multifaceted: like Social Security, perhaps the most notable and enduring of 
the New Deal programs, the redistributive features of the Patient Protection 
Act are both multimodal and intentionally obscure. The Act's terms 
effectuate at least three redistributions to a greater extent than preexisting 
law: (1) from the wealthier to the poorer; (2) from the younger to the older; 
and (3) from the healthier to the sicker. 
Like Social Security and Medicare, the fact that the Act embodies 
multiple pathways of redistribution as opposed to even greater tax increases 
on wealthy Americans helped to facilitate its passage.22 The Act, however, 
is more redistributive than Social Security. To the extent it redistributes not 
just from the young to the old but significantly also from the wealthy to the 
poor and from the healthy to the sick. But more so than the redistribution 
inherent in Social Security, the multiple redistributions effectuated by the 
Patient Protection Act also raise some nontrivial theoretical concerns, as 
17. See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United Slates­
Origins and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006). 
18. See John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicare, 340 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 327 (1999). 
19. See Skocpol & Williamson, supra note 7, at 1203-04. 
20. Id 
21. See Kathleen Pender, How Health Reforms Will Change Taxes, S.F. eHRON., Apr. 4, 
2010, at EI (noting that high-earning Americans "will pay for a good chunk of health care 
reform through higher Medicare taxes on their earnings and a new Medicare tax on investment 
income"). 
22. Cf Demography and the Economy: As Boomers Wrinkle, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. I, 
2011 (noting the unpopularity o f the "unprecedented increases in taxes" potentially required to 
finance health and other benefits for aging Americans). 
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well as the potential to sow public discontent and political rejection. For 
instance, redistribution based on income can be justified by economic 
theories such as the diminishing marginal value of extra income in ways 
that are not directly transferable to redistribution from nonwealthy healthy 
young people to sicker people at the same or greater income level.23 
I will take the Act's three main redistributive methods in tum. First, as 
noted by Professors Skocpol and Williamson, the new statute more sharply 
redistributes resources for health insurance based on income.24 One clear 
implication of the bill is that wealthier Americans will pay more to 
subsidize the health care of poorer citizens, both through the Medicaid 
expansion and through the public subsidies for exchange participation. 
Whether such redistribution goes too far, or not far enough, are questions of 
degree that will be debated in the years ahead. This debate will intensifY as 
increasing cost pressures may cause future rounds of increased financing. 
As is well-documented and frequently discussed, health care cost increases 
are growing at significantly greater rate than the overall inflation rate, and 
health care accounts for an ever-increasing percentage of GDP, making the 
need to control costs within the next decade more pressing.25 
Notably, however, the expanded coverage and underwriting reform that 
the Act enforces are also funded by two other, less visible, redistributive 
techniques: increased redistribution of resources (1) from healthy people 
(including those making far less than $100,000 per year) to sicker people; 
and (2) from younger Americans to older individuals. These other 
redistributive vectors apply to both the public and private health insurance 
provisions of the bill, but are evident most starkly in the private market 
reforms and related sections of the statute.26 
The Act redistributes based on age in the private insurance market by 
placing "age-rating" limitations on health insurance pricing coupled with 
the mandate that all individuals purchase health insurance if able. 27 From an 
23. For a discussion of these concerns in the context of individual mandates, see Allison 
Hoftinan, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual lvfandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health 
Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 33-34 (2010) (exploring "good reasons to believe it is not fair to 
ask the young to bear the costs of care for those older and sicker than themselves" though 
ultimately coming out in favor of individual mandates). 
24. Skocpol & Williamson, supra note 7, at 1203-04. 
25. See KAJSER FAMILY FOUNDATION, TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE COSTS AND SPENDING 
(2009), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf (documenting projection 
that under current trends by 2018 U.S. healthcare spending will exceed 20% of GDP and be 
over $13,000 per capita). 
26. See PPACA, § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154-61. 
27. See §§ 1501 and 5000A, 124 Stat. at 242-49 (individual mandate) and § 1201, ]24 
Stat. at 154-61 (defining exclusive pennissib]e rating criteria for individual and small group 
markets). 
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actuarial (predictive) perspective, a healthy sixty-three year-old person costs 
much more to insure than a healthy twenty-eight year-old person?8 If 
insurance companies could price that risk accurately, as many attempted to 
do before passage of the Act, they would charge the fifty-eight year-old 
significantly more than the twenty-eight year-old.29 By limiting age-rating 
to a factor of three to one, the Act requires a forced subsidy, or quasi-tax, on 
younger people who buy insurance and pay more than the actuarial risk they 
present. 30 This private market subsidy is an addition to the preexisting age­
based redistribution effectuated through the large-scale public programs 
such as Medicare and Social Security, which are entitlements for older 
individuals funded by wage taxes on younger workers. 3, 
There is nothing inherently unethical, or particularly unusual, about such 
upward redistribution of resources within a nation's health system. Many 
other nations with universal health care finance their systems significantly 
through regressive wage-based payment schemes rather than through a 
more progressive income tax.32 And of course the quintessential New Deal 
program, Social Security, is funded in large part though contributions on a 
fixed portion of income currently capped at $106,800.33 But the upward 
redistribution is further compounded in the health insurance context by the 
fact that people in their last few years of life account for a high proportion 
of overall health expenditures. 34 
Such age-based redistribution is acceptable as part of a durable 
intergenerational deal, where workers pay (otherwise regressive) amounts 
28. See Micah Hartman et aI., Us. Health Spending by Age. Selected Years Through 2004, 
27 HEALTH AFF. 1 (documenting fact that per-person spending by those 65 and older was over 
five times that of per capita spending for children and over three times that of "working age" 
adults), http://content.healthaffairs.org/contentl27ll/w l.full.pdf. 
29. See Anna Wilde Mathews, Effort to Assist Older Voters May Raise Costs for the 
Young, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10,2009, at A4 (noting that in states without age-rating restrictions 
"older peopie may pay five or six times as much" as younger insureds for the same policy). 
30. See PPACA, § 1201, 124 Stat. at 154-61. 
31. See Michael Doran, Inte;generational Equity in Fiscal Policy Reform, 61 TAX L. REv. 
241,244-52 (2008) (specifying the manner in which the early amendments to Social Security 
effectuated an ongoing intergenerational transfer of wealth). 
32. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Private or Public Approaches to Insuring the Uninsured: 
Lessonsfi-om International Experience with Private Insurance, 76 N.Y.U. L .  REv. 419, 433-35 
(2001) (explaining that Germany, the United States, and many countries in Central and Latin 
American and Asia fund public insurance programs under a Bismarckian "social insurance" 
model that is funded by payroll contributions). 
33. See Doran, supra note 31, at 248-53; see also Social Security Administration, 
Contribution and Benefit Base, http://,vww.ssa.gov/OACT/COLAlcbb.html (last visited Oct. 8, 
2010). 
34. See. e.g .• Christopher Hogan et aI., Jl1edicare Beneficiaries' Costs of Care in the Last 
Year olLife, 20 HEALTH AFF. 188, 190 (2001). 
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now in order to be taken care of in the future. For most Americans who 
worked during the twentieth century, for instance, the redistributive 
component of Social Security operated over decades as a kind of self­
centered distribution: people's younger selves were taxed in order to 
provide for their older selves.35 Likewise, this has been the basic 
assumption for the Medicare program that has existed since the 1960s. This 
intertemporal individual redistribution from an earlier stage of life to a later 
one worked so long as the cost profile of expenditures for older individuals 
matched the pool of new incoming payments from existing workers. 
The challenge in the health insurance context will be to  sustain the 
system so as to make good on this intergenerational bargain. Health care 
costs in the United States are increasing at a far greater pace than gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth, making the current system of finance and 
delivery unsustainable beyond the next decade or two at the latest. 
Numerous cost estimates show a Medicare system under deep fiscal strain, 
with current predictions holding that the Medicare trust fund will be 
insolvent within two decades under current spending levels, even 
accounting for the cost saving components of the new health statute. 36 
Private health insurance spending is increasing at an even greater rate in the 
past decade. 37 
In reality, then, absent systemic change many younger Americans will be 
paying now for a health care system that will not exist when they most need 
it later in life. They faced this prospect before 2010 under the existing 
Medicare financing mechanism; but the new Patient Protection Act makes 
them pay also to support rising premiums in the private sector by virtue of 
the restrictions on actuarially accurate age-rating.38 With the exception of 
some tentative steps toward reducing Medicare payment costs years from 
now/9 the new Act's provisions only indirectly stem these cost increases. 
Future legislation, and determined political effort, will likely be necessary 
before the systemic drivers of cost increase are brought under control. 
Much of the foregoing analysis applies as well to the Act's third major 
mechanism of redistribution-from healthier individuals to sicker 
individuals. This sort of redistribution is inherent in any health insurance 
pool, private or public, and is unobjectionable on several different 
35 . See Dor an, supra note 31, at 244-52. 
36. See Jackie Calmes, Law Will Reform Medicare Fund, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
6 ,2010, available at http://www.nytimes.comi201 O/08/06lhealthJpoucyJ06medicare.html. 
37. See Drew Altman, Larry Levitt & Gary Claxton, An Actuarial Rorschach Test (2010), 
available at htlp:llwww.kff.org/pullingittogetherI021610altman.cfill-
38. See Mathews, supra note 29 (noting that in stat�s without age-rating restrictions "older 
people may pay five or six times as much" as younger insureds for the same policy ). 
39. See PPACA §§ 3401-3403, 124 Stat at 480-507. 
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justifications. The only questions are ones of degree and modality: is 
"taxing" health, as the Act does by restricting insurers' ability to price 
according to health risk and preexisting illness, more or less regressive than 
taxing income to pay for those with ill health? A system that financed care 
for the poor and sick entirely through a progressive income or wealth tax 
might well produce a more equitable distribution and-given the 
diminishing marginal value of money-be relatively more optimal from an 
overall utility perspective. But such a system would be politically more 
difficult to enact and operationalize. 
In sum, the authors are correct to note that the passage of the PPACA 
stands, for the time being at least, as a "remarkable achievement"---one 
ambitious in scope and potentially transformative going forward. But as of 
this writing it is far from clear whether the Act will be eventually regarded 
as "another New Deal." The New Deal transformation was welcomed by a 
larger majority of Americans at the time than the PPACA currently enjoys, 
and soon attained even higher levels of public support.40 By contrast, the 
PPACA stands on wobbly footing in the fall of 2010, with the opposition 
party making political gains in part due to pledges to repeal it. The elections 
of 2010 and 2012 will go far in either entrenching the PPACA as a true 
"New Deal" for American health care or in setting up the political 
preconditions for its unraveling. Whatever the result, it is clear that 
important chapters in American health care reform remain to be written. 
40. See. e.g.. Laura Kalman, Law. Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165, 
2170-71 (1999) (noting the "stnnning popularity" of President Roosevelt and his early New 
Deal refonns as manifested in the midtenn elections of 1934). 
